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Abstract 
We investigated whether differences in quality of firm level corporate governance can explain the firm 
level performance in cross-section of companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange. We analyzed 
relationship between firm-level value and total Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and three sub-indices: 
board composition, shareholdings and ownership and disclosures and transparency for a sample of 50 firms 
listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. The firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q, return on asset and return 
on equity. The results indicate that corporate governance does matter in Pakistan. However not all elements 
of governance are important. The board composition index and ownership and shareholdings index enhance 
firm performance, where as disclosure and transparency index has no significant effect on firm 
performance. However we point out those adequate firm-level governance standards which can not replace 
the solidity of the firm. The low production and bad management practices can not be covered with 
transparent disclosures and transparency standards.  
 
JEL Classification: G12 G34 G38 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Tobin’s Q, return on asset, return on equity, agency problem, board size, 
share holdings, disclosures, leverage. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is the means by which minority share holders are protected from 
the expropriation of the managers or controlling shareholders. Good corporate 
governance contributes to sustainable economic development by enhancing the 
performance of companies and increasing their access to outside capital. In emerging 
markets good corporate governance serves a number of public policy objectives. It 
reduces vulnerability of the financial crises, reinforces property rights; reduces 
transaction cost and cost of capital and leads to capital market development. Corporate 
governance concerns the relationship among the management, board of directors, 
controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. In Pakistan, the 
publication of Corporate Governance Code 2002 by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) for publicly listed companies has made it an important 
area of research of corporate sector. 
 
The better corporate governance leads to better firm performance by protecting the rights 
of outside investors from the expropriation of controlling shareholders. In Pakistan, with 
traditionally low dispersion of ownership, the primary methods to solve agency problems 
are the legal protection of minority investors, the use of boards as monitors of senior 
management, and an active market for corporate control. In contrast to developed markets 
in Pakistan corporate governance is characterized by lesser reliance on capital markets 
and outside investors, but stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial 
institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate sector. In this case, outside (smaller) 
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investors face the risk of expropriation in the form of wealth transfers to larger 
shareholders. 
 
The main focus of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance for publicly listed Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) firms. In the 
firm level corporate governance characteristics we considered board composition and 
effectiveness, ownership and shareholding rights, auditing, transparency and disclosure 
quality. They are summarized in an aggregate corporate governance index (CGI) which is 
computed as sum of three indices. We not only investigate whether corporate governance 
broadly defined affect firm performance, but identify whether some corporate governance 
factors are more important than other corporate governance proxies and firm value which 
is measured by Tobin Q, return on assets (ROA) return on equity (ROE) and dividend 
payout (D/P) with corporate governance practices adopted by these firms.  
 
This study extends our earlier work (Javid and Iqbal, 2007) in several ways: by updating 
the data to 2007, adding more variables and using panel data estimation technique. It 
contributes to the emerging literature in Pakistan relating indices of corporate governance 
to firm level performance measured by Tobin Q (which is market performance measure 
and captures market penetration) and return on assets and return on equity (which are 
accounting performance measures). This study adds to existing literature by applying the 
relevance of law for corporate governance in Pakistan and emphasizes that beyond the 
law on book, law enforcement must be credible (La Porta et al., 1999; Pistor et al., 2000). 
Like many developing countries corporate ownership is not dispersed in Pakistan 
(Cheema et al., 2003). Most of the firms are closely held either by family, directors, 
foreigners and institution owners. La Porta et al (1998) argue that primary conflict in the 
closely held firms is between majority and minority shareholders. This phenomenon is 
known as tunneling (Johnson et al., 2001). This study adds to existing literature by 
investigating whether corporate governance measures effects firm’s performance in the 
same way when ownership is concentrated. 
  
The plan of the study is as follows. The review of empirical findings of previous research 
is presented in section 2. Section 3 briefly reviews the corporate governance policy 
framework of Pakistan.  Section 4 provides empirical methodological and a description of 
the data. The results for the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
valuation are presented in section 5 and last section concludes the study. 
 
2. Review of Previous Empirical Findings 
There is a large of body of empirical research that has assessed the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance for the developed markets (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Bahjat and Black, 1999 and 2001; Black, 2002; Bradley, 2004; Drobetz et al., 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005;  Roe et al., 1996; Gompers et al., 2003 and numerous others). 
These studies have shown that good governance practices lead to significant increase in 
the economic value added of firms, higher productivity and lower risk of systematic 
financial failure for countries. The studies by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), John and 
Senbet (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide an excellent literature review 
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in this area. It has now become an important area of research in emerging markets as well 
(Klapper and Love, 2003; Javid and Iqbal, 2007 and Mir and Nishat, 2004).  
 
There are some empirical studies that analyze the impact of different corporate 
governance practices in the cross-section of countries. A noteworthy study in this regard 
is done by Mitton (2001) with Korean, Malaysian, Indonesian, Philippines and Thailand 
firms’level data find that the firm-level differences in variables are related to corporate 
governance has strong impact on firm performance during East Asian Crisis in 1997 and 
1998. The results suggest that better price performance is associated with firms that have 
indicators of higher disclosure quality, with firms that have higher outside ownership 
concentration and with firms that are focused rather than diversified.  
 
Most of the empirical work for exploring possible relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance is done for single jurisdiction. For US Firms a broad 
measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score, is prepared by Brown and Caylor (2004) 
and their findings indicate that better governed firms are relatively more profitable, more 
valuable and pay more cash to their shareholders. Gompers, et al (2003) show that firms 
with stronger shareholders rights have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales 
growth, lowest capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. 
 
It is expected that limiting board size is to improve firm performance because the benefits 
by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poorer communication 
and decision-making of larger groups (Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen, 1993). The 
study by Yermack (1996) provides an inverse relation between board size and 
profitability, asset utilization, and Tobin’s Q which conform this hypothesis.  Anderson, 
et al. (2004) document that the cost of debt is lower for larger boards, because creditors 
view these firms as having more effective monitors of their financial accounting 
processes. Brown and Caylor (2004) add to this literature by showing that firms with 
board sizes between six and fifteen have higher returns on equity and higher net profit 
margins than do firms with other board sizes 
 
The relation between the proportion of outside directors, a proxy for board independence, 
and firm performance is inconclusive. Fosberg (1989), Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no relation between the proportion of outsider directors and various 
performance measures. In contrast, Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) show that the market rewards firms for appointing outside directors; 
Brickley, et al. (1994) find a positive relation between the proportion of outsider directors 
and the stock market reaction to poison pill adoptions; and Anderson et al. (2004) show 
that the cost of debt, as proxied by bond yield spreads, is inversely related to board 
independence. The studies based on financial statement data and Tobin’s Q find no link 
between board independence and firm performance, while those using stock returns data 
or bond yield data find a positive link (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 and Bhagat and 
Black, 2002). Brown and Caylor (2004) do not find Tobin’s Q to increase in board 
independence, but they do find that firms with independent boards have higher returns on 
equity, higher profit margins, larger dividend yields, and larger stock repurchases, 
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suggesting that board independence is associated with other important measures of firm 
performance aside from Tobin’s Q. 
 
The evidence on the association between audit-related governance factors and firm 
performance is mixed. Brown and Caylor (2004) show that independent audit committees 
are positively related to dividend yield, but not to operating performance or firm 
valuation. Klein (2002) documents a negative relation between earnings management and 
audit committee independence, and Anderson et al. (2004) find that entirely independent 
audit committees have lower debt financing costs.  
 
The separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman affects firms’ performance 
because the agency problems are higher when the same person holds both positions. 
Yermack (1996) shows that firms are more valuable, when the CEO and board chair 
positions are separated. Core, et al. (1999) find that CEO compensation is lower when the 
CEO and board chair positions are separate. Brown and Caylor (2004) conclude that 
firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate.  
 
In past few years corporate governance has become an important area of research in 
Pakistan. Mir and Nishat (2004) and Shaheen and Nishat (2004) empirically test the link 
between corporate governance structure and firm performance for Pakistan using one 
year cross-firm data and find a positive relation between governance and firm 
performance measures. Javid and Iqbal use Generalized Method of Moments and 
document a positive and significant association between the quality of firm-level 
corporate governance and firm performance for the period 2003 to 2006. 
 
There is an increasing interest in analyzing affect of corporate governance on stock 
market in Pakistan but many issues in this area are uncovered. In particular, the firm-level 
corporate governance rating and its affect on the valuation of the firm which is central 
issue of this area needs in depth research. It is in this perspective this study aims to make 
contribution in the literature on corporate governance.  
 
3.  Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
The code of corporate governance introduced by Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP) in early 2002 is the major step in corporate governance reforms in 
Pakistan. The code is initially started as a joint effort of SECP and Institute of Chartered 
Accountant Pakistan (ICAP). All listed companies are required to comply with most 
provisions of the code.  
 
The corporate legal framework includes the corporate Ordinance 1984 which sets the 
rules for the governance and regulations of companies and certain other associations and 
is based on common law. Banks are regulated by the banking company ordinance (BCO) 
1962 and prudential issued by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The key legislation of 
corporate governance includes the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 the 
Companies Ordinance 1984 and Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1997 that 
established the SECP as principle regulator of securities markets and non-bank 
companies and also non-listed companies. The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 
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is the basic securities law, and provides for investor protection, market regulation, 
securities delisting and related matters, and the prevention of fraud and insider trading. 
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance Act 1997 established SECP as regulator of 
capital marked and controller of corporate entities. The listed Companies (Substantial 
Acquisition of Voting shares and Takeovers) Ordinance 2002 establishes additional take 
over and ownership disclosure rules. In addition to listing rules, disclosures, the listing 
rules include special regulations on transfer pricing. The listed companies must inform 
the exchanges about dividends, annual general meetings (AGMs), capital increases and 
change in boards. 
 
The code includes many recommendations in line with international good practice. 
Several provisions of code were already added to Corporate Ordinance 1984, when it was 
amended into 2002, in order to strengthen monitory shareholders’ rights. The State Bank 
also mandated the application of code for all listed and non-listed banks and 
Development Finance Institutes (DFIs). This requirement backed by State Bank 
considerable enforcement capacity resulted in significant changes within banking system. 
The SECP issued a separate code for insurance companies. 
 
The basic shareholders rights are protected in Pakistan. The registration is secure and 
dematerialized through Central Depository Committee (CDC). Shareholders can demand 
a variety of information directly from the company and have a clear right to participate in 
Annual General Meetings (AGMs). Directors are elected using a form of cumulative 
voting and can remove through share holder resolution. The changes in the company 
articles, increasing authorized capital and sale of major corporate assets are require 
shareholders approval.  
 
While more effective enforcement contributed to improve compliance, some companies 
do not hold AGMs or hold in places where it is difficult for shareholders to reach. The 
law also does not support voting by post or electronically. The concentrated control limits 
and influence of minority shareholders, and effectively reduce their protection from 
abuse. When families dominate the shareholders meeting and board, director’s 
accountability to other shareholders become critical and currently in Pakistan this 
accountability is absent in many companies. The shareholder recording process for share 
holdings in the CDC works effectively. However, although the registration’s role has 
been reduced by the CDC’s operations, some inefficiencies are still there. Some 
companies do not pay dividend on time, and take longer than 5 days to re-register share 
in the name of depository. The annual reports of SECP suggest that the percentage of 
companies paying dividends is 35% and shareholders can complain SECP about non 
payment of dividends. 
 
The quality of disclosure has improved over last four years due to increasing monitoring 
role of the SECP and the requirement of code. Shareholders owning 10% or more of 
voting capital disclose their ownership and the annual report includes the pattern for 
major shareholdings. However pyramid structure, cross holdings and the absence of joint 
action make it difficult for outsiders to understand the ownership structure of companies, 
especially in case of business groups. 
 6 
 
The family owned companies are typically managed by owners themselves. In case of 
state owned enterprises and multinationals there is often direct relationship between 
state/foreign owners and management again bypassing the boards. Many important 
corporate decisions are not made on Board AGMs level. The code explicitly mentions 
director’s duties to act with objective of independent judgment and in the best interest of 
company. In business groups boards are dominated by executive and non-executive 
members of controlling family and by proxy directors appointed to act on their behalf. 
Inter-looking directorships are often used to retain majority control. Family dominated 
boards are less able to protect minority shareholder’s rights and risk a loss of 
competitiveness as other boards become more professional. 
 
The code strengthens the role of non-executive directors by restricting the percentage of 
executive director to 75% in non-financial firms and recommending that institutional 
investor in 75% in non-financial firms and recommending institutional investor by 
representation. However given the dominant ownership structure, this does not prevent 
controlling families from having disproportionate representation on the board.  
 
The SECP is enforcing corporate governance regulations. It is receiving technical 
assistance from Asian Development Bank to improve corporate governance enforcement 
program and also from World Bank is build awareness and training. Other elements of 
enforcement regime are not so strong. ICAP has some self regulatory function and stock 
exchanges lack in the resources and expertise to effectively monitor implementation of 
the code.  Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) has set up a Board Committee on the Code of 
Corporate Governance and a unit in the Company Affairs Department to monitor 
compliance with the code. 
 
3. Data and Methodological Framework 
3.1 Data 
To assess the relationship corporate governance and firm valuation at firm level, we use 
data of 50 firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange
2
. The data set is obtained from the 
annual reports of these firms for the year 2003 to 2007
3
. Data on rule of law has been 
taken from World Bank governance indicators. The ranking of rule of law as ranging 
from 0 to 1 for Pakistan is 0.34 as average of five years. That indicates very poor legal 
environment for Pakistan in term of enforcement of law
4
. 
 
The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency index are used which 
are developed by the authors in their study (Javid and Iqbal, 2007). In order to construct 
corporate governance index for the firms listed on KSE, a broad, multifactor corporate 
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governance rating is done which is based on the data obtained from the annual reports of 
the firms submitted to SECP. The index construction is as follows: for every firm, 
twenty-two governance proxies or indicators are selected, these indicators are categorized 
into three main themes. The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight factors for 
the board composition index, seven for ownership and shareholdings index and seven for 
transparency, disclosure and audit index. 
 
The weighting in the construction of index is based on subjective judgments. The 
assigned priorities amongst and within each category is guided by empirical literature and 
financial experts in this area. The maximum score is 100, a score of 100 is assigned if 
factor is observed, 80 if largely observed, 50 for partially observed and 0 if it is not 
observed. The average is taken out for all the factors belonging to the sub-index and we 
arrive at the rating of one sub-index
5
. By taking the average of three sub-indices we 
obtain the aggregate corporate governance index for each firm in the sample. 
 
The size is defined as natural logarithm of total asset and growth of sales is taken as 
investment opportunities. The leverage is defined as ratio of book value of long term debt 
to book value of total asset. The data of all these variables are obtained from the annual 
reports of the listed firms in the sample. 
 
3.2 Empirical Methodology 
It is well established that country’s laws of corporate governance affect firm value
6
. The 
objective is to examine whether variation in firm-specific governance is associated with 
differences in firm value, when they have different characteristics (size, investment 
opportunities and leverage) and doing business in poor legal environment.
7
 To explore 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance we test the 
hypothesis 
 
H1: Firms with good corporate governance practices are valued higher.  
 
itiiiiii CGILwSizeLevInvCGIPerf   *54321        (1) 
 
Where iPerf is performance measure Tobin’s, D/Pi, ROAi and ROEi are used to measure 
firm performance, iCGI is a vector of corporate governance index, iInv is investment 
opportunities measured by the past growth in sales, iLw is rule of law that is used for the 
proxy of enforcement of law, and iSize  is measured by the log of total asset,. i  is random 
                                                 
5
 Sub-Index include(i)Board composition index,(ii) The ownership and shareholdings Index, (iii) 
Disclosure and Transparency 
 
6 La Porta et al. (2002) show that firm value is positively associated with the rights of minority 
shareholders. Daines (2001) finds that firms incorporated in Delaware have higher valuations than other 
U.S. firms. 
 
7
As indicated by the ranking of rule of law by World Bank. 
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error term. It is expected that firms that are adopting better governance practices with 
better investment opportunities and larger is size should have higher valuation. 
 
In exploring that good corporate governance cause higher firm valuation, an important 
issue is endogenity (Black et al., 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2003 and others). The firms 
with higher market value would be more likely to choose better governance structure 
because the firm’s insiders believe that better governance structure will further raise firm 
value. In addition, the firms adopt good governance to signal that insiders are doing well 
to raise the firm value. A growing firm with large need of external financing has more 
incentive to adopt better governance practices in an attempt to lower cost of capital 
(Klapper and Love, 2003 and Gompers et al., 2003). These investment opportunities are 
reflected in the valuation of the firm, implying a positive association between governance 
and firm performance. Therefore, in estimating governance-performance relation we use 
panel data to control for endogenity applying system GMM estimation procedure.  
 
To deal with issue we also include a set of control variables following Kaplan and 
Zingales, (1997); Black et al., (2003) and Klein et al., (2005). The firm performance is 
regressed on corporate governance indices and other control variables. Along with three 
governance indices, board, shareholdings and disclosure, a set of control variables which 
include size (ln assets), leverage (debt/total asset ratio) and investment opportunities 
(growth rate of sales) are used in estimation. Firm size and investment opportunities 
control for potential advantages of scale and scope, market power and market 
opportunities. The leverage controls for different risk characteristics of firm.  
 
 4. Empirical Findings 
To investigate whether differences in the quality of firm level corporate governance also 
help to explain firm level difference in performance, we regress firm performance 
measures on index of corporate governance ( iCGI ) and control variables The firm’s 
performance is measured by Tobin Q, ROA, ROE and D/P and the results are reported in 
Table 1, 2, and 3. The results of association between corporate governance indices and 
Tobin Q are presented in Table 1. The Tobin Q is regressed on the total corporate 
governance index iCGI  with each sub-index add one by one along with set of control 
variables There is positive and significant relationship between iCGI  and Tobin’s Q 
supporting our hypothesis that corporate governance affects firm value. The iCGI  
remains positive but significance level reduces with adding more explanatory variables. 
This shows that the inclusion of firm characteristics have improved the specification of 
the model. Therefore we find evidence that corporate governance effects firm’s 
performance. This result suggests that a certain level of governance regulations in 
emerging market like Pakistan has not make the overall level of governance up to a point 
that governance remain important for investor. The inter-firm differences in firm 
characteristics are matters to investor in valuing firm. This result is also conformed by 
several studies for developing markets as well as developed markets (La Porta et al., 
2002 and Drobetz et al., 2004). The financial control variables are for the most part 
statistically significant. Investment opportunities have positive impact both iCGI and sub-
indices. This confirms the theoretical notion that firms with better investment 
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opportunities perform better corporate governance practice. The firm size has positive 
and significant association with firm performance. The leverage is positively and 
significantly related to firm performance. The interaction terms of legal environment with 
corporate governance show positive and insignificant relationship with Tobin Q which 
suggests that in legal environment which is less investor friendly, firm specific factors 
matter more in choice of corporate governance practices. 
 
The results based on total corporate governance suggest that corporate governance does 
matter in Pakistani stock market. However these findings do not fully reveal the 
importance of each category of corporate governance to firm performance. The results 
regarding relationship of firm value with three sub-indices and all control variables. 
These results indicate that two sub-indices except disclosure have positive and some 
significant impact on firm performance. The board composition and ownership and 
shareholdings have some significant influence on firm performance. However investors 
are not willing to pay a premium for companies that are engaged in open and full 
disclosure. The results based on sub-indices reveal importance of board composition, 
ownership and shareholdings with firm performance and this evidence is also supported 
by other studies (Klein et al (2005)). 
 
The board composition index has a positive and statistically significant effect on firm 
performance and when entered in model with other sub-indices it remains positive but 
become insignificant however, the coefficient of determination has improved. The past 
evidence generally failed to find any clear relation between board composition and firm 
performance. The survey of literature concludes that the evidence on this matter is at the 
best ambiguous (Bahjat and Black (1999 and 2000) and Hermalian and Weisbach 
(2003)). The ownership and shareholdings sub-index has a positive effect on Tobin Q 
when it is entered into model alone however, when included along with other sub-indices 
this effect is turned insignificant. These results show that most of the firms have 
ownership with dominant block holder or have ownership concentration and in block 
holder firm board independence is not associated with good performance. The 
assumption of agency theory does not fully apply to these firms where the alignment of 
ownership and control is tighter thus suggesting the need of outside directors on the board 
of these firms. As control variables are included specification of model improves. 
 
The results of firm performance including control variables are also consistent with prior 
research. The coefficient of size is positive and significant in most of the cases. This 
shows that the listed firms that are likely to grow faster usually have more intangible 
assets and they adopt better corporate governance practices. The coefficient of investment 
opportunities is significant and positive because higher growth opportunities are 
associated with higher firm valuation. The coefficient of leverage is positive and 
significant, is consistent with the prediction of standard theory of capital structure which 
says that higher leverage increases firm’s value due to the interest tax-shield (Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). The interaction terms of legal environment with corporate governance 
sub indices show positive and insignificant relationship with firm performance indicating 
that in weak legal regime the firm chose to adopt better governance practices. 
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Table 1: Evidence on Firm Performance and Corporate Governance: 
The table reports the results of relationship between firm valuation and corporate governance estimated by 
Generalized Method of Moment: 
itiiiiiii InvLwCGILwSizeLevInvCGIPerf   ** 654321  
Perfi is the performance measure Tobin Q of firm i at time t.  
CGIi is the aggregate corporate governance index for firm i  
DISCI  is audit, disclosure and transparency score for firm i  
Boardi is score of board composition and independence 
Sharei is score of shareholdings 
Invi is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sales,  
lawi is rule of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of law, and  
Sizei is measured by the log of total asset. 
Levi is long term debt/total assets  
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis 
are t-statistics. 
 
Dependent variable is Tobin Q 
Independent 
Variables 
1 2 3 3 4 
CGI 
 
0.03** 
(1.97) 
 
    
Board  0.01* 
(5.04) 
  0.02* 
(2.06) 
 
1Share  
  0.04** 
(3.14) 
 0.01 
(1.41) 
 
DIS    0.04 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
 
INV 0.03** 
(1.98) 
0.02* 
(2.04) 
0.003* 
 (3.51) 
0.003 
(2.36) 
0.002* 
(2.15) 
 
SIZE 0.05* 
(5.27) 
0.04* 
(4.46) 
0.04* 
(3.85) 
0.05* 
(4.20) 
0.04* 
(3.05) 
 
Lev 0.06* 
(3.70) 
0.06* 
(4.00) 
0.04* 
(2.16) 
0.06 
(4.06) 
0.06* 
(2.09) 
 
LAW*CGI 0.003 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.71) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 
Constant -0.07 
(-0.37) 
-0.15 
 (-0.23) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(-0.79) 
-0.06 
(-0.80) 
 
R2 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.39 
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Table 2: Evidence on Firm Performance and Corporate Governance: 
The table reports the results of relationship between firm valuation and corporate governance estimated by 
Generalized Method of Moment: 
itiiiiii CGILwSizeLevInvCGIPerf   *54321  
Perfi is the performance measure ROA of firm i at time t.  
CGIi is the aggregate corporate governance index for firm i  
DISCI  is audit, disclosure and transparency score for firm i  
Boardi is score of board composition and independence 
Sharei is score of shareholdings 
Invi is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sales,  
lawi is rule of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of law, and  
Sizei is measured by the log of total asset.  
Levi is long term debt/total assets  
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis 
are t-statistics. 
 
Dependent variable is ROA 
Independent 
Variables 
1 2 3 3 4 
CGI 
 
0.39** 
(1.52) 
 
    
Board  0.13* 
(2.00) 
  0.21** 
(1.84) 
 
1Share  
  0.01 
(1.23) 
 0.13*** 
(1.52) 
 
DIS    0.23* 
(2.71) 
0.06 
(1.26) 
 
INV 0.02** 
(1.39) 
0.02*** 
(1.46) 
0.01** 
 (1.32) 
0.03* 
(2.36) 
0.0*** 
(1.38) 
 
SIZE 0.26* 
(6.62) 
0.29* 
(6.29) 
0.27* 
(5.26) 
0.28* 
(2.85) 
0.28*** 
(1.69) 
 
Lev 0.33* 
(5.31) 
0.33* 
(4.26) 
0.33* 
(3.26) 
0.31* 
(4.88) 
0.06* 
(2.09) 
 
LAW*CGI -0.11 
(-0.51) 
-0.42* 
(-1.11) 
-0.03 
(-0.08) 
0.44* 
(1.26) 
-0.10 
(0.46) 
 
Constant 0.26 
(0.33) 
0.22 
 (0.29) 
0.31 
(0.40) 
0.71 
(0.91) 
-0.06 
(-0.80) 
 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.33 
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Table 3: Evidence on Firm Performance and Corporate Governance: 
The table reports the results of relationship between firm valuation and corporate governance estimated by 
Generalized Method of Moment: 
itiiiiii CGILwSizeLevInvCGIPD   */ 54321  
Perfi is the performance measure is Dividend Payout of firm i at time t.  
CGIi is the aggregate corporate governance index for firm i  
DISCI  is audit, disclosure and transparency score for firm i  
Boardi is score of board composition and independence 
Sharei is score of shareholdings 
Invi is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sales,  
lawi is rule of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of law, and  
Sizei is measured by the log of total asset.  
Levi is long term debt/total assets  
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis 
are t-statistics. 
 
 Dependent variable is D/P 
Independent 
Variables 
     
CGI 
 
0.01** 
(1.64) 
 
    
Board  0.02* 
(2.06) 
 
  0.01 
(1.13) 
1Share  
  0.01 
(1.41) 
 
 0.01 
(1.37) 
DIS    0.01* 
(2.44) 
 
0.02 
(0.51) 
INV 0.22** 
(1.96) 
0.22** 
(1.88) 
0.17*** 
(1.65) 
0.12*** 
(1.59) 
 
0.01** 
(1.84) 
SIZE 0.03* 
(2.02) 
0.04*** 
(1.38) 
0.02*** 
(1.40) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
 
0.01* 
(2.05) 
Lev 0.02** 
(1.90) 
0.06* 
(2.02) 
0.03** 
(1.83) 
0.01** 
(1.84) 
 
0.02* 
(2.72) 
LAW*CGI 0.16 
(0.81) 
0.26 
(1.17) 
0.04 
(1.02) 
0.05 
(1.21) 
 
0.13 
(1.11) 
Constant -0.62 
(-0.71) 
-2.13 
(-1.50) 
-0.77 
(-0.81) 
-0.80 
(-0.38) 
 
1.65 
(0.94) 
R2 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.37 
 
 
The results based on association between ROA and corporate governance and ROE and 
corporate governance are almost same. In Table 2 and we present results regarding 
relationship of firm value using return on assets with aggregate corporate index and three 
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sub-indices and all control variables. The evidence suggests that corporate governance 
affects corporate valuation in Pakistani stock market. However, these findings suggest 
that the importance of each category of corporate governance is not important in 
explaining firm performance. These results indicate that two sub-indices: board 
composition and disclosures have positive and some significant impact on firm 
performance. The ownership and shareholdings have no significant influence on firm 
performance. These results show that most of the firms have ownership with dominant 
block holder or have ownership concentration and in these firms the return on assets are 
not associated with good performance. The large sized firms with more investment 
opportunities and are levered have high return on asset. As regards the quality of legal 
environment the interaction terms of rule of law with corporate governance show no 
relationship with return on asset which suggests that in weak legal environment the law 
does not matter in firm valuation. (La Porta et al., 2000) 
 
To investigate the relation between firm value measured by dividend pay-out ratio and 
corporate governance D/P is regressed on corporate governance and firm attributes: 
investment opportunities, size, leverage and size. Positive and significant coefficient of 
CGI reveals the fact that firms with higher-quality corporate governance are valued 
higher. When we regress D/P on sub-indices of corporate governance, we get positive 
and significant results for board composition and disclosure and transparency index but 
positive and insignificant for shareholder and ownership indices. In general the 
ownership and shareholders rights that align the managers and shareholders interest are 
significantly valued by investors. This is also true for board composition and 
independence index.  Both sub-indices board and disclosures have positive association 
with firm performance. These results are consistent with agency theory which focuses on 
monitoring of managers whose interests are assumed to diverge from those of other share 
holders. However the assumptions of agency theory are not applied to block holder 
owned firms. Most of the firms listed on KSE are family owned or institution owned. In 
these firms the alignment of ownership and control is tight and thus suggesting the need 
of outside directors on the board. Interaction term for CGI with law has the expected 
positive sign for Pakistan with poor legal environment is consisted with notion that 
positive relationship between corporate governance and valuation is stronger in weak 
legal regime. The study by Dernev and Kim (2003) also concludes that high class 
corporate governance is valued higher in case of US market. 
 
Investment opportunities have positive and significant impact on corporate valuation 
measured by the D/P in all specifications.  Our results confirm our predictions that firms 
with better investment opportunities have higher dividend payout ratio. The coefficient of 
size is positive and significant in most of the cases. This shows that the listed firms that 
are likely to grow faster usually have more intangible assets and they adopt better 
corporate governance practices. The coefficient of leverage is positive and insignificant, 
which is contrary with the prediction of standard theory of capital structure which says 
that higher leverage increase firm’s value due to the interest tax-shield (Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). The result of interaction term of rule of law with corporate governance 
and investment opportunities do not have any significant impact on the valuation of the 
firm. These results indicate that legal framework is not providing relevant information 
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regarding firm dividend pay-out in case of Pakistan. However, these findings are 
consistent to some extent with the notion that positive relationship between governance 
and valuation is stronger in weak legal regimes (La Porta et al., 1997). This explains the 
reason of mixed relation between firm valuation and corporate governance in US firms 
which are subject to strongest legal framework worldwide (La Porta et al.,1998 and 
Dunev and Kim, 2003). 
 
When dividend pay-out is used as performance measure the aggregate corporate 
governance and the board composition and independence has a positive and statistically 
significant affect on firm’s dividend payout and when entered in model with other sub-
indices. The ownership and shareholdings sub-index has a positive effect on firm 
performance when it is entered into model alone and also when is included with other 
sub-indices but this affect is marginally significant or it remains positive but become 
insignificant however, the coefficient of determination is improved. These results show 
that most of the firms have ownership with dominant block holder or have ownership 
concentration in block holder firm board independence is not associated with good 
performance. The assumption of agency theory does not fully apply to these firms where 
the alignment of ownership and control is tighter thus suggesting the need of outside 
directors on the board of these firms. As control variables are included specification of 
model improves. 
 
The results of dividend payout regressed on corporate governance including control 
variables are also consistent with prior research (Arnott and Asness, 2003 and Shaheen 
and Nishat, 2004). There is positive association between corporate governance and 
dividend payouts consistent with the theoretical notion that the firms that are better 
governed payout more. The coefficient of size is positive and significant in most of the 
cases. This shows that the listed firms that are likely to grow faster usually have more 
intangible assets and they adopt better corporate governance practices. The coefficient of 
investment opportunities is significant and positive because higher profitable 
opportunities are associated with higher firm valuation. The coefficient of leverage is 
positive and significant, this is consistent with the prediction of standard theory of capital 
structure which says that higher leverage increases firm’s value due to the interest tax-
shield (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The interaction terms of legal regime with investment 
opportunities show positive and insignificant relationship with CGI, board, shareholdings 
and disclosure scores which suggests that in legal environment which is less investor 
friendly, firm specific factors matter more in choice of corporate governance practices. 
These results are consistent theoretical proposition of La Porta et al. (1999) and with 
empirical findings by Durnev and Kim (2003) and Pistor et al. (2003). 
 
5 Conclusions 
The relationship between corporate governance variables has been widely analyzed for 
the developed markets but very little work has been done on how a broad range of 
governance mechanism factors effect the firm performance in thinly traded emerging 
markets. In this study we fill this gap by analyzing the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance for the Karachi Stock Market. To proxy for firm-level 
governance we use a rating system to evaluate the stringency of a set of governance 
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practices and cover various governance categories: such as board composition, ownership 
and shareholdings and transparency. Our sample consists of 50 firms which are active, 
representative of all non-financial sectors and comprises more than 80% of market 
capitalization at Karachi stock market.  
 
Our results document a positive and significant relation between the quality of firm-level 
corporate governance and various firm performance measures. In general the ownership 
and shareholders rights that align the managers and shareholders interest are significantly 
valued by investors. This is also true for board composition and independence index.  
Both these sub-indices have positive association with firm performance. These results are 
consistent with agency theory which focuses on monitoring of managers whose interests 
are assumed to diverge from those of other share holders. However, the assumptions of 
agency theory are not applied to block holder owned firms. Most of the firms listed on 
KSE are family owned or institution owned. In these firms the alignment of ownership 
and control is tight and thus suggesting the need of outside directors on the board. 
However, the results show that open and transparent disclosure mechanism that reduces 
the information asymmetry have no affect on firm performance. This is due to the reason 
that we have used the annual reports as data source and these reports do not reveal all the 
information required for rating corporate governance. As regards the quality of legal 
environment the interaction terms of rule of law with corporate governance show no 
relationship with firm performance; which suggests that even firms in weak legal 
environment can enjoy high valuation if they adopt better quality governance and 
disclose practices (La Porta e tal., 2000). 
 
 
Our results show that Corporate Governance Code 2002 improves the governance and 
decision making process of firms listed at KSE. Large shareholders still have a tight grip 
of companies. However, we point out that adequate firm-level governance standard can 
not replace the solidity of the firm. The low production and bad management practices 
can not be covered with transparent disclosures and transparency standards.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 
A1: Corporate Governance Index (CGI) Components 
 
Sub-Index 1: The board of directors                                              
i). Board Size (number of directors) 
ii). Board Composition (Clear cut job description of all board members). 
iii). Chairman CEO separation (if not any lead director). 
iv). Outside directors available to board (independent directors, nominee directors) 
v). Board attendance (board meetings). 
vi). Outside director attendance in Meetings. 
vii). Existence of the position of CFO. 
viii). Directors representing minority shareholders. 
 
Sub-Index:2 Ownership and Shareholdings                                            
i). Presence of outside block holder (more than 10 % shareholdings). 
ii). Does the CEO own shares. 
iii). Directors ownership (block ownership) other than CEO and Chairman. 
(iv). Chairman or CEO is Block Holder (10%). 
v). Concentration of ownership (Top five). 
vi). Dividend Policy 
vii). Staff benefits other than wages and salaries 
 
Sub-Index 3: Transparency, Disclosures and auditing                                             
i). Does the company have full disclosure of corporate governance practices. 
ii). Does the company disclose how much it paid to its auditor for consulting and other 
work 
iii). Does the company disclose full biographies of its board members 
iv). Disclosure of internal audit committee 
vi). Disclosure of board directors and executive staff members’ remuneration 
vii). Disclosure in the company’s annual report) of share ownership according to the 
requirement of Code.. 
viii). Information of the executive management staff members ownership (employees 
ownership) 
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A2: List of Companies 
Companies Symbles 
1)Aruj Garments ARUJG 
2)Honda Atlas HONDAA 
3)Engro Chmecial ENGRO 
4)Unilever Pakistan UNIP 
5)Pakistan Gum and Chemicals Ltd PAKGUM 
6)Abbot Pakistan ABBOT 
7)Sakrand Sugar Mills SAKSM 
8)Pakistan Hotel development Ltd PAKH 
9)Bata Pakistan BATA 
10)Pakistan Petroleum mtd PPL 
11)Oil and Gas development Corp Ltd OGDC 
12)Agriauto Industries Ltd AGRI 
13)Pakistan PVC Ltd PAKPVC 
14)Pakistan Papaersack Corporation PAKPAPC 
15)Mandviwalla Mauser MANDM 
16)Shahtaj Sugar Mills SHAHT 
17) S.G. Fibre LTd SGFL 
18)Mirza Sugar Mills MIRGAS 
19)Emco Industries limited EMCOI 
20) Metropolitan Steel METRO 
21)Moonlite(Pak) MOONLITE 
22)Merit Packing Ltd MERITP 
23)Pakistan Services PAKS 
24)ICI pakistan ICIPAK 
25)Suzuki Motorcycles SUZM 
26)Mohammad Farooq Textiles MOHFT 
27)Paramount Spinning Mills PSM 
28)Azam Textiles AZAM 
29) Dar Es Salaam DARES 
30)Sindh Abadgar,s SINDHA 
31) Ellcot Spinning Mills ELLCOTS 
32) Ayesha Textile AYSHAT 
33) Brother textiles Ltd BROTHERT 
34)Mitchell's Fruit MITCH 
35) Indus polyester company INDUSP 
36) Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills MIRS 
37) Nestle Pakistan NESTLE 
38)Din Moters DINM 
39) Indus Moters INDUSM 
40) Maple Leaf cement MAPLEL 
41) National refinary NATR 
42) Pakistan Tobaco PAKTAB 
43)Dawod Hericules DAWOODH 
44) Sui Nothern SUIN 
45) Fuji Fertilizer FFC 
46)Fuji Bin Quasim FBQ 
47)PTCL PTCL 
48)Ferozson LTD FERL 
49) Southern Electric SOUTE 
50) Japan Powers JAPP 
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Table A3: Description of Variables. 
Variable Symbol Definition 
Tobin Q Q Tobin Q defined as sum of the book value of long 
term debt and market value of the equity divided by 
the book value of the total asset. Source: Annual 
Reports of Corporations. 
Return on Assets ROA A performance measure. It is measured by operating 
profit divided by the book value of total asset. 
Source: Annual Reports of the Corporations 
Return on Equity ROE A performance measure. It is measured by operating 
profit divided by the equity capital. Source: Annual 
Reports of the Corporations 
Investment 
Opportunities 
Inv Average Sales Growth. Source: Annual Reports of 
Corporations 
Corporate Governance CGI Score of Corporate Governance Index. Source: Javid 
and Robina (2006). 
Disclosure Dis Disclosure and Transparency Scores. Source: Javid 
and Robina (2006). 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Own  Percentage of share ownership of first five largest 
shareholders. Source: Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
Size of the Firm Size Ln(Assets). Source: Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Law Lw Rule of law. Source World Bank. 
Leverage Lev Book value of Long term Debt/Book value of total 
asset. Source: Annual Reports of Corporations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
